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ENFORCING THE ANTIDUMPING LAWS:
THE TELEVISION DUMPING CASE
John J. Nevin*
Dumping is the practice of selling products in an export market at a price
below the price at which a comparable product is sold in the home market
or selling a product in an export market at a price below its cost of production.
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) states:
"dumping .. . is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury
to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party . . .-
No American industry has been more characterized by employee layoffs,
widespread plant shutdowns, financial losses, mergers and corporate liquidations
than has the American television industry. More than a decade ago American
television producers concluded that it was the dumping of Japanese television
receivers in the American market that was causing the financial distress in
the domestic industry and turned to the Government of the United States for
the protection against dumping supposedly afforded by the Antidumping Act
of 1921.2
As required by the Antidumping Act of 1921, American television
manufacturers, in March of 1968, submitted their dumping complaint to the
U.S. Treasury. 3 Treasury took almost three years to respond but in December
of 1970 advised the U.S. Tariff Commission (later the International Trade
Commission) that Japanese television receivers were being dumped in the
United States.4 Three months later the Tariff Commission found that the
American industry was being injured by the dumping.5 Upon being advised of
the injury finding, the Secretary of the Treasury became responsible for
assessing a special dumping duty in the amount of the difference between the
"purchase price" of the dumped merchandise in the United States and the
"foreign market value" of that merchandise. 6 "
The three years between the submission of the dumping complaint in 1968
and the Tariff Commission's injury finding in 1971 were years of financial
crisis for American television producers. In 1968, nine of the sixteen American
producers lost money. In 1969, eight of the remaining fifteen U.S. producers
lost money. In 1970, ten of the fifteen U.S. producers lost money. 7
Despite the economic chaos that was apparent in the television industry a
decade ago, Treasury has done essentially nothing to collect the television
dumping duties that are mandated by law. The television dumping case is
Chairman of the Board, Zenith Radio Corporation.
I. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, March 1969, art. IV, para. I.
2. Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, § 201, 42 Stat. 11 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-172) (1978).
3. Under 19 U.S.C. 160(c)(1) information may be given to the Secretary in order to initiate an
investigation. Through its attorneys, the Imports Committee, Tube Division, Electronic Industries
Association notified the Commissioner of Customs of the antidumping violations in a letter dated
March 22, 1968.
4. 35 Fed. Reg. 18,768 (1970).
5. News Release, United States Tariff Commission, Determination of Injury in Investigation No. AA1921-66
(March 4, 1971).
6. The amount of the duty to be collected by the Secretary of the Treasury on such merchandise is set
forth in 19 U.S.C. § 161 (1978).
7. TC Publication 436 (1971).
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a ten-year long story of false and fraudulent submissions made by television
importers to the Government of the United States and of unconscionable delays
on the part of those importers in providing information that had been requested
by the U.S. Government. The television case also provides instances in which
the U.S. Treasury itself has been as deceitful as the importers and as responsible
as they for long delays in the enforcement of the law.
THE HISTORY OF THE DUMPING CASE
When the Tariff Commission reached its injury finding in 1971, the Customs
Service, which reports to Treasury, undertook to determine television dumping
margins by establishing the difference between the "purchase price" of imported
Japanese television sets and their "foreign market value.". The effort was
concentrated on establishing the foreign market values for Customs assumed
that the purchase prices had been correctly stated on Customs documents
submitted at the time television sets had been imported. That assumption
would later prove to be invalid.
In 1963, the Japanese television manufacturers, with the approval of Japan's
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) entered into written
agreements establishing, among other things, the minimum prices at which
Japanese television receivers would be sold to American purchasers.8 The
minimum prices became known as check prices. For many years the documents
submitted to Customs by large importers of Japanese television receivers almost
invariably showed purchase prices that were the same as the minimum prices
listed in the Japanese check price agreements.
In 1970, Zenith Radio Corporation advised Treasury, in a confidential
meeting, of its belief that the check prices being used by importers on Customs
documents were not in fact the real prices at which imported Japanese television
receivers had been purchased. Zenith Radio Corporation supported its assertion
with an independent consultant's report stating that Japanese television
manufacturers were offering substantial rebates to American purchasers who
had ostensibly purchased at the check prices. 9 By failing to report the rebates
to Customs, the American importer could avoid television dumping penalties
that might later be assessed.
Zenith urged Treasury in 1970 to investigate the financial records of large
American television importers to determine the validity of the rebate assertions.
Treasury refused to pursue the matter. Some years later, however, a document
produced in International Trade Commission hearingsl o would show that, within
a few months of the supposedly confidential meeting in Treasury, manufacturers
and importers of Japanese television sets were warned by a U.S. attorney for
the Electronic Industries Association of Japan that Zenith was "placing pressure
on the U.S. Treasury Department" to investigate double pricing. The document,
dated October 22, 1970, noted that: "Zenith had not produced any substantiating
data to backup the charges." It went on to say: "Whether our files of
8. These agreements are explained in a statement submitted by the Japanese Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
in the case of In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 402 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
9. Mentor International, Report on Imported Television Set Pricing Phase II (Sept. 19, 1969) (Prepared
for Zenith Radio Corporation).
10. Television Receivers, Color and Monochrome, Assembled or not Assembled, Finished or not Finished,
and Subassemblies Thereof: Hearings Before the United States International Trade Commission 1340-41
(Jan. 21, 1977).
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correspondence and old purchase orders should be purged will have to be
discussed with our legal people."'
Between March of 1971 and April of 1972 Treasury collected about $1
million in television dumping duties. 12 In March of 1972, however, the assessment
of dumping duties on Japanese television receivers was stopped and not resumed
until March of 1978. At no time during the six years from March of 1972
until March of 1978 did Treasury acknowledge that the assessment process
mandated by American law had been halted. The six-year interruption has
never been explained.
The Congress, in the Trade Act of 1974, authorized the International
Trade Commission to investigate unfair trade practices allegations either in
response to a complaint from an American manufacturer or on its own initia-
tive. 13 Early in 1976 GTE-Sylvania filed an unfair trade practices complaint
against Japanese television manufacturers with the International Trade
Commission. 14 The Sylvania complaint alleged "the existence of predatory
pricing schemes resulting in below-cost and unreasonably low-cost pricing of
such television sets in the United States." A few months later the International
Trade Commission announced a broader investigation of possible violations of
American antidumping, customs fraud and antitrust laws associated with
television importation. 15
The two ITC investigations became immersed in delay and controversy.
Japan's Foreign Office refused for an extended period of time to grant visas
to a team of Sylvania lawyers and accountants seeking to gather evidence in
Japan. The Departments of State, Treasury and Justice moved in concert to
restrict severely the proposed unfair trade practices investigations. Treasury
claimed sole responsibility for investigating dumping and related customs fraud
allegations and refused to permit ITC investigators to see Customs' files.
Justice similarly claimed exclusive responsibility for antitrust investigations.
In September of 1976, the Secretary of the Treasury wrote to the Commission
explaining the reasons for Treasury's refusal to cooperate with Commission.
investigators. With reference to the television dumping case, the Secretary said:
"As required by the Act, dumping duties are being, and will continue to be,
assessed on merchandise subject to the finding so long as it is sold at less
than foreign market value or, as appropriate, constructed value." 16 The
Secretary's assertion was totally inaccurate and completely misleading. At the
time the letter was written, four and one-half years had elapsed since Treasury
had last assessed a television dumping duty.
While the authority of the ITC to investigate unfair trade practices
associated with television importation was being debated in 1976, color television
imports from Japan jumped from 1,044,000 units in 1975 to 2,530,000 units
11. This document was originally produced in response to a subpoena duces tecum served by Zenith Radio
Corporation on The Magnavox Company in the course of discovery proceedings in In re Japanese
Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 402 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
12. Assessment and Collection of Duties Under the Antidumping Act of 1921: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978)
(statement of Robert Mundheim, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury).
13. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (Supp. 1978).
14. GTE-Sylvania filed its complaint on January 15, 1976. The United States International Trade
Commission issued a Notice of Investigation No. 337-TA-23 on March 29, 1976.
15. 41 Fed. Reg. 14,949 (1976).
16. Letter from William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury, to Will E. Leonard, Chairman of the United
States International Trade Commission (received September 24, 1976).
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in 1976.17 As a result, COMPACT 18, a group representing American television
industry labor unions and manufacturers petitioned the International Trade
Commission for tariff or quota protection against the flood of color television
imports from Japan. Late in 1976 the Commission voted to hold bearings on
the quota petition and to suspend its investigations of unfair trade practices
with respect to television importation.
In January of 1977 Zenith, although not a member of COMPACT, testified
on behalf of the petitioners. 19 In its testimony Zenith demonstrated, from
television sales brochures obtained in Japan, that the least expensive 19-inch
color television receivers available for sale in Japan were priced at 150,000
yen or something over $500 at the then existent exchange rate of about 300
yen to the dollar. Zenith also showed an advertisement for a 19-inch color
television imported from Japan and offered for sale in the United States at
a price under $300. Zenith submitted to the Commission engineering analyses
that showed that the Japanese receivers sold in the home market for over
$500 were essentially identical to the Japanese receivers being sold in the
United States for less than $300.
Zenith recommended in the hearings that any tariff or quota protection
provided the American television industry be limited to the time period necessary
to determine the validity of the unfair trade practices allegations. Following
the hearings, however, the United States negotiated a television Orderly
Marketing Agreement with Japan. 20 Sylvania's unfair trade practices complaint
was settled through a consent decree. 21 The broader unfair practices investigation
proposed by the Commission itself was terminated despite the unchallenged
charges of dumping and other unfair trade practices that had been presented
to the Commission.
A little more than a year after the OMA had been negotiated, the Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations gave to the Trade Subcommittee of the
House of Representatives a copy of a side letter that had been provided to
the Government of Japan at the time the Orderly Marketing Agreement was
signed. 22 The side letter had not previously been made public. In the side
letter the Japanese Government was assured by the United States that the
International Trade Commission would be urged tc terminate its investigation
of television dumping and leave the dumping issue entirely in the hands of
the Department of Treasury. The Government of Japan was also assured that
"The Treasury Department will carry out these efforts in strict conformity
with the International Antidumping Code."
17. United States Department of Commerce statistics.
18. The members of COMPACT are: Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO; Allied Industrial Workers
of America, International Union; American Flint Glass Workers Union of North America; Communications
Workers of America; International Association of Machinists; International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers; International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers; United Furniture Workers of
America; United Steelworkers of America; Corning Glass Works; GTE-Sylvania Incorporated;
Owens-Illinois, Inc.; Sprague Electric Company; and Wells-Gardner Electronics Corporation.
19. Public Hearing on Investigation No. TA-201-19 Before the United States International Trade Com-
mission (January 8, 1977).
20. The Orderly Marketing Agreement (OMA) provided for a voluntary limitation of color television
exports to the United States. Orderly Marketing Agreement, March 22, 1977, United States-Japan.
21. In re Certain Color Television Receiving Sets, Consent Order, 337 TA 23, United States International
Trade Commission (July 29, 1977).
22. Letter from Robert S. Strauss to His Excellency Fumihiko Togo, Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of Japan (May 20, 1977). The contents of the letter were read into the record at the
hearing. Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978) (statement of Ambassador Robert
Strauss).
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The Congress, almost ten years earlier, had categorically rejected the
International Antidumping Code. 23 In Title II of the Renegotiation Amendments
Act of 1968 the Congress had directed the Secretary of the Treasury to
"resolve any conflict between the Antidumping Code and the Antidumping
Act, 1921, in favor of the Act . . . " and to "take into account the provisions
of the International Antidumping Code only insofar as they are consistent
with the Antidumping Act, 1921. ' '24 If the side letter represented an effort to
evade the intent of .Congress, it is highly improbable that the Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations was himself responsible for that effort.
He had, at the time the side letter was signed, held his position for less than
three months and would have had no reason, from his prior experience, to be
familiar with the 1968 Congressional action.
In early 1977, as the International Trade Commission hearings were ending,
the U.S. Customs Service obtained information indicating that the purchase
prices declared on Customs documents at the time television receivers had
been imported into the United States may have been falsely stated. According
to a report directed to the Commissioner of Customs: "A voluntary tender of
duties was made by an importer (Gambles) in early 1977. The importer's
records show that the Japanese manufacturer Mitsubishi was engaged in 'double
pricing,' i.e., presenting Customs an invoice showing one price while the actual
or true price was in fact lower. Such a practice effectively reduces or eliminates
dumping duties."'25
The disclosure led Customs immediately to review records available to the
public in an antitrust case Zenith had filed in 1974.26 Customs learned from
that review that other importers had also been engaged in double pricing.
According to the report to the Commissioner of Customs: "Subsequent to the
double invoicing disclosure, the Office of Investigations undertook a massive
inquiry of large importers of TV's including large mass retailers as well as
subsidiaries of Japanese TV producers. The investigation revealed rebate schemes
as well as other practices directed to the masking of potential antidumping
duties. ' 27 In March of 1978 the U.S. Customs Service turned over to the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice evidence, with respect to
undisclosed kickbacks and rebates, that it had accumulated to support possible
prosecutions for fraud.
Early in 1979, in a front page story on the television dumping case, the
New York Times quoted from an internal Customs memorandum in which a
senior Customs officer had written: "the U.S. Customs Service has at present
in its possession documented evidence that Japanese producers of television
receivers, in concert with certain U.S. purchasers, have engaged in double
invoicing to circumvent the provisions of the U.S. antidumping statutes. ' 28 The
Times reported that grand juries were then considering evidence in what was
described "as the largest fraud inquiry in the recent history of the Customs
Service." As many as eighty American companies were reported to be under
investigation including three of this country's leading retailers. 29
23. S. Rep. No. 1385, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4539 (1968).
24. Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-634, 82 Stat. 1345 (1968).
25. Memorandum from V. Hann, Acting Assistant Commissioner (Operations), Department of the Treasury,
United States Customs Service, to the Commissioner of Customs (April 1978).
26. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 402 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
27. See note 25 supra.
28. Hersh, Inquiry Told of Customs Fraud in Imports of Japanese TV Sets, The N.Y. Times, Jan. 24,
1979, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
29. Id.
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On March 30, 1979, the New York Times reported that Alexander's Inc.,
a department store chain, had pleaded guilty in federal court to a customs
fraud charge involving the importation of thousands of television sets from
Japan. 30 Alexander's was reportbd by the government to have submitted an
invoice indicating it had paid $72.00 for each Japanese television it had
imported. In fact, Alexander's had paid about $47.00 for it had obtained a
rebate of approximately $25.00 per set.31 The fact that eighty American
companies, including three of this country's largest retailers, were involved in
customs fraud investigations suggested how pervasive the dumping and customs
fraud schemes had been. The disclosure that Alexander's had obtained rebates
approximating $25.00 from a price reported to have been $72.00 suggested
how predatory those schemes had been.
The evidence indicating that many importers had deceived Customs, with
respect to the prices at which Japanese television sets had been purchased in
the United States, led Customs to investigate intensively the accuracy of
information that had been submitted by'importers with respect to the foreign
market values of those receivers. Reporting on that investigation to the Under
Secretary of the Treasury, the Commissioner of Customs said: "In the television
case we have uncovered considerable evidence that the basic information
submitted by a number of Japanese television manufacturers is false."' 32
A Customs officer, explaining the results of the investigation to a large
group of attorneys for television importers, was more specific. He noted that
Customs had found that "a significant number of the foreign market value
submissions appeared questionable on their face when compared to cost of
production submissions," and that when Customs had formally requested access
to Japanese cost of production data that had been submitted to the International
Trade Commission, the manufacturers had "either refused to supply the
information, or refused to respond at all . . . -33
The Customs Service borrowed technical experts from the International
Trade Commission and the Federal Communications Commission to check the
data the manufacturers had submitted to pair sets imported into the United
States with sets sold in Japan. The experts concluded that "in a substantial
number of cases the sets identified by the manufacturers as the sets sold in
the Japanese home market most comparable to the sets exported to the United
States were, in fact, not the most comparable, but, rather, quite differ-
ent." 34
Labor in Japan is paid on the basis of seniority. It is possible for a long
service employee to be paid twice or three times as much for the same work
as is paid to a very short service employee. According to Customs, the Japanese
manufacturers had claimed that "only the most experienced workers were used
to manufacture sets sold in Japan, while the relatively inexperienced workers
were used in producing sets exported to the United States." Customs investigators
found this claim "virtually impossible to verify."' 35
30. Lubasch, Alexander's Guilty Plea on Imports, N.Y. Times, March 30, 1979, § D, at 1, col. 6.
31. Id.
32. Memorandum from Robert Chasen, Commissioner of Customs, to Bette Anderson, Under Secretary
of the Treasury, and Robert Mundheim, General Counsel of the Department of Treasury (October
18, 1977).
33. Disclosure Meeting Regarding the Japanese T.V. Dumping Cases, May 13, 1978 (statement of Irving
W. Smith, Jr., Chief of the Value Division).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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In late 1977 the Commissioner of Customs concluded that information
submitted by the television manufacturers could not be relied upon to establish
foreign market value in the television case. He concluded those values could
be developed quickly and accurately by using information derived from Japanese
Commodity Tax reports. In a letter to the Under Secretary of Treasury the
Commissioner supported his decision to adopt the Commodity Tax approach
when he said:
aside from the question of the integrity of the information received, we are
also of the opinion that the existing administrative procedures necessitating
the collection and analysis of vast amounts of commercial information before
an antidumping appraisement can be performed represents a perversion of the
intent of the Act, in that delays for unreasonable periods of time negate the
remedial protection intended by Congress for the affected United States
industry. 36
The Government of Japan levies a Commodity Tax on all television receivers
produced for sale in the Japanese market. The Japanese Commodity Tax law
stipulates that the tax is to be based on the freely offered selling price of the
product "for sales to all purchasers in ordinary wholesale quantities and in
the ordinary course of wholesale trade . . . .,37 The American Antidumping
Act of 1921 defines the foreign market value as the price at which the product
is offered for sale "in the principal markets of the country from which exported,
in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade for home
consumption ... -38
The two definitions were so nearly identical as to lead the Commissioner
of Customs to conclude that the task of establishing the foreign market value
of Japanese television receivers imported into the United States could be
accomplished with speed and accuracy by using the representations as to home
market wholesale prices the Japanese manufacturers themselves had made to
the Government of Japan. By mid-December, the Commodity Tax approach
to establish foreign market values had been approved by the responsible legal
authorities in both Customs and Treasury. On March 17 the Customs Service
took action to assess $400 million of television dumping penalties covering
receivers imported during the period from April of 1972 through early January
of 1977.
On March 27, 1978, Minister Yoshio Kawahara delivered to the Treasury
Department a copy of a note addressed to the State Department from the
Government of Japan. 39 The note strongly protested the method Customs had
used to establish dumping duties. Following the meeting with Kawahara,
Treasury decided to delay the assessment of all but $46 million of the television
dumping penalties.
The $46 million assessment covered a time period from the beginning of
1972 through June of 1973. The Treasury's decision to limit assessments to
the period ending in June of 1973 was made despite a strenuous written
recommendation by the Commissioner of Customs that the Treasury proceed
36. See note 32 supra.
37. Commodity Tax Law (Japan), § 11(1) and (2).
38. 19 U.S.C. § 164 (1978).
39. Note from the Government of Japan to the United States Department of State (received by the
Department of the Treasury, April 27, 1978).
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with the previously approved plan to assess television dumping duties through
January of 1977.40
On March 30, 1978, telegrams were sent to all U.S. Customs field offices
directing that television dumping assessments relating to shipments made
subsequent to June of 1973 be deleted from notices that were to be posted
on March 31, 1978.41 The necessary deletions were made by hand by Customs
field personnel before the bulletins were posted. Treasury then announced that
the Customs Service had assessed dumping duties of $46 million against
importers of Japanese television receivers. 42
On April 10, 1978, Congressmen Charles A. Vanik and Dan Rostenkowski
released a statement to the press challenging the action Treasury had undertaken.
They said:
We understand that the department limited its original action in this long
drawn-out case to one year of assessments so as to minimize the adverse
impact on importers-and, probably, to avoid banner headlines on the extent
of Japanese dumping in the American market. But the magnitude of the
present dumping liability on imported Japanese televisions is a problem of
Treasury's own making, since it is responsible for its failure to enforce the
antidumping act in a vigorous and timely fashion.
The history in this particular case of the lack of enforcement of the law
as it was written calls for a reconsideration by the Congress of where the
responsibility for administering the act should be placed. The degree to which
counsel for importers have been permitted to tie the hands of government
counsel in procedural snarls raises serious questions as to whether Treasury
intends to enforce the antidumping act at all. It is unfortunate that the
Treasury Department thought it appropriate to consult both with counsel for
the importers and representatives of the Japanese Government as to its proposed
action in this case but did not see fit to consult with Congress or representatives
of the domestic industry.43
The Congressmen's concern with respect to the impact of private meetings
between Treasury officials and representatives of Japanese manufacturers was
echoed in an April 18, 1978 memorandum written by U.S. Customs Office
of Regulations and Rulings attorneys to the Assistant Commissioner of Customs.
The Customs attorneys had been asked to hold disclosure conferences with
attorneys for television importers, Japanese manufacturers and certain Japanese
Government officials. The memo said:
Our difficulties at these meetings have been compounded by the fact that
Treasury has issued vague and conflicting information to the affected
importers/manufacturers/Government of Japan officials, concerning particular
facets of its policy, while again providing very little direct communication with
Customs. Effectively, Customs has been placed in the position of discovering
Treasury policy through the often dubious representations of the affected
parties.
The entire range of problems which have surfaced during the disclosure
conferences (especially the conference with Japanese Government officials)
40. Memorandum from Robert Chasen, the Commissioner of Customs, to the General Counsel of the
Department of the Treasury (March 1978).
41. Telex dated March 30, 1978 to all Regional Commissioners, District Directors, and Area Directors
of the United States Customs Service.
42. News Release, Department of the Treasury (March 31, 1978).
43. News Release, Congressmen Charles Vanick and Dan Rostenkowski (April 10, 1978).
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seem to be related to the parties' understanding that the liquidations of March
31 were in some way considered to be 'provisional' in nature, that Treasury
took this action primarily because of Congressional pressure, and that Treasury
does not expect that the $46 million in dumping duties assessed to date in
any way represents a final ascertainment of the liability due and owing.
Rather, those affected anticipate that the assessed amount will be mitigated
through informal government-to-government negotiations, or relatively informal
contacts between manufacturers and Treasury. 44
In July of 1978 the legal advisory and review function of the Customs
Office of Regulations and Rulings was transferred from the Commissioner of
Customs to Treasury's Chief Counsel. 45 At the same time the recommendation
function of the Commissioner of Customs, in connection with dumping cases,
was transferred to Treasury's General Counsel. The reorganization effectively
removed from the Bureau of Customs the authority and responsibility for
recommending or initiating action to enforce American antidumping laws. By
year end, however, it would be clear that the Office of Regulations and Rulings
attorneys had been correct in discerning that an effort would be made to settle
the television dumping case informally rather than in the manner anticipated
in the antidumping law.
The effort in 1977 and early 1978 to collect the $400 million in television
dumping duties had been code named "Project Omega" by the Customs officers
involved. Following the decision to reduce the assessments from $400 million
to $46 million, however, the "Project Omega" task force was disbanded. The
Senior Customs Attorney who had led the task force described the Treasury
action for Time magazine as follows: "Treasury pulled the plug. Out of the
blue they disbanded us. When I protested they told me I would be fired if I
continued to protest." Time reported that that attorney "who spent 13 years
working on antidumping matters, was moved to a new job: processing Freedom
of Information Act applications."'46
In September of 1978 the House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Trade held oversight hearings on the Assessment and Collection of Duties
Under the Antidumping Act of 1921. At the time of the hearings no effort
had yet been made to collect the $46 million in dumping duties that had been
assessed six months earlier. In response to a question from Congressman
Rostenkowski as to when Treasury would collect the $46 million, Treasury's
General Counsel testified: "I would say we are right on the threshold ofit.',47
In regard to when action would be taken to assess duties on television sets
imported after June 30, 1973, Treasury's General Counsel said: "First, the
Customs Service will move promptly to assess another portion of the backlog,
including all televisions imported up to January 1975." He then added: "Two,
the Customs Service will thereafter assess the remainder of the backlog as
rapidly as its ability to process the full case permits." The Commissioner of
Customs later presented a chart to the subcommittee that showed the $350
million in potential television dumping duties for the period June 30, 1973
44. Memorandum from Customs Attorneys to the Assistant Commissioner (Regulations and Rulings) (April
18, 1978).
45. Memorandum from Leonard Lehman, Assistant Commissioner, (Regulations and Rulings), United
States Customs Service, to all attorneys of the Office of Regulations and Rulings (July 17, 1978).
46. Time, March 26, 1979, at 64.
47. See note 12 supra.
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through January of 1977. He advised the committee that Customs planned to
clean up that backlog in about six months.
Treasury's General Counsel explained to the subcommittee that if an
importer could establish that there were differences in the cost of producing
television sets sold in Japan and sets sold in the United States, or that there
were differences in certain circumstances of sale (such as advertising costs or
warranty costs) then appropriate adjustments would have to be made to
wholesale prices before establishing dumping margins.
The General Counsel's testimony included comments on Customs past
experience with submissions previously made by Japanese television manufacturers
to support claims for cost of production or circumstance of sale adjustment.
He said that for the period 1972 through July of 1973 "information submitted
by all but one manufacturer was unreliable or incomplete or both." He went
on to say: "the Customs Service has concluded that the claims for adjustments
for differences in costs of production and circumstances of sale submitted by
the manufacturers during the July 1973 to January 1975 period are not reliable
and should not be allowed in computing the dumping duties." The General
Counsel then articulated Treasury's policy with respect to future claims for
adjustment saying: "the Customs Service will consider evidence of adjustment
claims as sufficiently persuasive only if that evidence is prepared with express
reference to manufacturers' documentation . . . and only if all of the
documentation is subject to satisfactory field verification. '48
In late December of 1978, however, Treasury's General Counsel sought
the support of Congressmen Charles Vanik and Dan Rostenkowski for a
proposal to settle the television dumping case for about $50 million. 49 Television
dumping penalties for receivers imported between March of 1972 and January
of 1977 had been estimated to total $400 million. Because of the rapid change
in the yen-dollar relationship, dumping penalties for receivers imported in 1977
and 1978 were expected to total an additional $200 million. The $50 million
settlement would have amounted to less than ten cents on the dollar.
The Treasury proposal also contemplated that civil penalties that might be
assessed for the failure to disclose rebates and kickbacks would be settled for
an additional $5 to $10 million. If the kickbacks and rebates were as widespread
as many suspect, the civil penalties that could be assessed to importers would
approximate $200 million. The settlement of the possibly very substantial civil
penalties, before grand juries acted in the criminal cases, would have permitted
importers to plead guilty or nolo contendere to criminal charges, pay the
criminal penalties, which are normally less severe than the civil penalties, and
avoid a public trial.
Congressmen Vanik and Rostenkowski flatly rejected the proposal. Congressman
Vanik told the New York Times: "I certainly don't think we should compromise
grand jury proceedings, and it would compromise them -to try to dispose of
this claim before the grand jury has settled the issue of fraud." 50
In the months following the September Trade Subcommittee hearings,
virtually no action was taken to assess the $350 million in dumping duties on
receivers imported between June 30, 1973 and January of 1977 despite the
assurances offered in the hearings that the backlog would be cleaned up in
about six months. Shortly after the September hearings, Treasury did set
48. Id.
49. Hersh, supra note 28, at 1.
50. Id.
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November 27, 1978 as the due date for payment of the $46 million in dumping
payments that it had told the Subcommittee it was "on the threshold" of
collecting. The November due date was later extended to December 27, 1978,
the December due date was then extended to January 27, 1979 and the
January due date was finally extended to March 12, 1979.
On March 13, 1979, the Customs Service announced that importers would
have to pay the $46 million in dumping penalties that had been assessed but
as yet had not been collected. 51 The importers were told, however, that only
part of the payment need be made in cash and that the remainder of the
obligation could be fulfilled with promissory notes. There was no mention in
the March announcement of what, if any, action would be taken to assess the
still unliquidated dumping duties for imports after June 30, 1973.
The March announcement stated that the Customs Service expected by
August 1, 1979 to complete its review of protests importers had filed to support
their claims that the $46 million assessment of dumping penalties should be
reduced or eliminated. The importers had been permitted to support the protests
with new documentation to replace the documentation that had previously been
found by Customs to be unreliable. '
Treasury, having disbanded the "Project Omega" task force, assigned a
new group of nine staff attorneys to the task of dealing with the collection
of the $46 million in dumping duties that had been assessed on March 31,
1979. The group had been asked to "formulate 'estimates' of the amounts by
which the dumping duties assessed on March 31, 1978, will be reduced." In
a memorandum dated March 2, 1979 and signed by the nine staff attorneys,
the group stated that:
It is our understanding that these 'estimates' will be used to help determine
the portion of outstanding dumping duties which will be collected in March
of this year. We understand that the amount of duty remaining after the
'estimated' circumstance of sale adjustments have been made, on a manufacturer
by manufacturer basis, will be collected in cash. The balance is to be secured
by promissory notes. 52
The attorneys summarized their concern with the possibility that their work
might be misunderstood or misused with the statement:
[TIhe entire 'estimate' exercise is ,premised upon a number of factual
assumptions. Foremost among these assumptions is that all claims for adjustments
will be established by the manufacturer to the satisfaction of Customs. We
wish to point out that the figures derived during this exercise cannot, under
any circumstances, be construed as having been accepted as substantiated to
the satisfaction of the undersigned staff attorneys. 53
Each time the word "estimate" had been used in the memorandum, it had
been placed in quotation marks. The memorandum suggested strongly that the
new group of attorneys enlisted to replace Customs veterans in the television
case were as determined as their predecessors to enforce the antidumping laws.
As the claims for adjustment were being considered by Customs officers, the
Japanese manufacturers launched public protests against the dumping assessments.
51. News Release, Department of the Treasury (March 13, 1979).
52. Memorandum to File from Staff Attorneys, Department of the Treasury, United States Custom Service
(March 2, 1979).
53. Id.
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In newspaper advertisements and in other appeals for support spokesmen
for the Japanese television manufacturers asserted that the Customs decision
to base dumping duties on "foreign market values" arrived at by using Japanese
commodity tax information was unfair.54 They asserted that adoption of the
commodity tax formula represented "changing the rules after the game has
started" for they had been previously led to believe that "foreign market
values" in the case would be based on documentation they themselves had
submitted to Customs. The opposing view, of course, contended that the long
history of false and/or fraudulent submissions made to Customs by the
manufacturers fully justified the adoption of an alternate approach to determining
home market prices. The opposing point of view also contended that the values
the Japanese manufacturers had assigned to television sets in paying taxes to
their own government represented the best evidence available for establishing
home market prices.
The newspaper advertisements and other appeals for support also asserted
that Customs having adopted the commodity tax formula in 1978 had unfairly
"made it retroactive-assessing penalties for the years 1971-'73." The opposing
view contended, that the long delay in establishing assessments was attributable
largely to deceit and delay on the part of the importers and manufacturers
themselves and, thus, that delay could hardly be accepted as grounds for
reducing the assessments. In addition the opposing view contended that the
deceit and delay had already provided the importers and manufacturers with
handsome returns for they had not yet paid in 1978 monies that might readily
have been collected as early as 1972. With interest costs in the 8-10% range
during the period the long delay had produced a substantial monetary benefit
for the importers.
Eight years after the Tariff Commission had published its television case
injury finding in 1971 it was still unclear as to whether the dumping penalties
assessed in the television case would ultimately be determined by enforcement
action undertaken by the Customs Service, by an agreement negotiated officially
or unofficially by American and Japanese diplomats or by litigation. The long
history of the television case had certainly made it clear, however, that the
United States did not possess the will or the means to enforce its antidumping
laws.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DUMPING
When the Tariff Commission concluded in 1971 that the American television
industry had been injured by dumping, it also concluded that the sellers of
dumped Japanese receivers "have for the most part undersold U.S. manufacturers
of television sets in the domestic market" and that sales of the dumped
television receivers "have contributed substantially to declining prices of
domestically produced television receivers."
The failure during the past eight years to impose the dumping penalties
mandated by law has permitted importers of Japanese television sets to continue
dumping. The dumping, in turn, has made it impossible for American producers
to raise prices. (Appendix A)
In the last decade the prices of industrial commodities and the hourly
earnings of American workers have doubled. Television prices have increased
54. The Washington Post, February 6, 1979, § A, at 8-9, col. 1.
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by about 2%. Had American television producers raised their prices sufficiently
to recover even a portion of the skyrocketing material and labor costs they
were incurring, they would have been driven from the American television
market by the importers of Japanese receivers as completely as they had some
years earlier been driven from the American radio market.
The cost-price squeeze caused by the inability to raise prices has had a
catastrophic impact on United States television industry earnings. In the ten
years 1968-1977, American television producers other than Zenith earned pretax
profits amounting to 2.1% of sales. In the five-year period, 1973-1977, American
producers other than Znith earned pretax profits averaging only 0.4% of sales.
Pretax profits in American manufacturing industries other than the television
industry have averaged approximately 8% of sales. (Appendix B)
In the five-year 1973-1977 period, some 60,000 jobs were eliminated in
the American television industry.55 About twenty American communities ex-
perienced the human and economic dislocations associated with the shutdown
of a major television manufacturing facility.
Since 1973, five of America's best known television manufacturers have
been forced into acquisitions or liquidation. In late 1973, Admiral was acquired
by Rockwell International. In 1974, Motorola's television business was sold to
Matsushita, the largest of the Japanese television companies. Later in 1974,
Magnavox was acquired by an American affiliate of N.V. Philips
Gloeilampenfabrieken of the Netherlands, Europe's largest television producer.
Still later in 1974, Ford Motor Company sold its Philco television brand name
and distribution assets to GTE-Sylvania. The Philco manufacturing assets were
liquidated. In 1976, Warwick, a company that had supplied private-brand
television products to Sears, was acquired by Sanyo of Japan. During 1978
General Electric sought, but failed to obtain Justice Department acceptance
of a proposal to merge its television business with that of an American affiliate
of Hitachi of Japan. By the end of 1978, Rockwell International had announced
it would liquidate the Admiral television business it had acquired five years
earlier.
The explanation for the financial difficulties of American television producers
is not to be found in inadequate management. The explanation is to be found
in the long continued dumping of Japanese television receivers in the American
market.
Ford Motor Company, Motorola and Rockwell International have impressive
records of efficiency and profitability in other industries. Each, however,
incurred sizable losses in the American television market. General Electric is
regarded to be among the best managed of American companies but after
years of inadequate profits it found it necessary to seek to merge its television
business with that of Hitachi of Japan.
In March of this year the least expensive 19-inch television receivers
available for sale in Japan were still priced at about 150,000 yen. At the
current exchange rate of about 200 yen to the dollar, that amounted to $750.
Comparable receivers imported from Japan for sale in the United States are
priced under $350. The least expensive large screen furniture models in Japan
are now priced at about 390,000 yen or just under $2000. Consoles with
55. In the Investigation on Television Receivers and Certain Parts Thereof Pursuant to Section 201 of
the Trade Act of 1974; Hearing Before the United States International Trade Commission, January
18, 1977 (statement of 1. W. Abel).
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comparable features and screen sizes are readily available in the United States
at prices of about $750.
No nation has benefited more than Japan from the willingness of other
nations to relax import restrictions and to encourage a free exchange of goods.
Japan, however, while exploiting opportunities in the markets of its trading
partners, has persisted in pursuing a protectionist policy at home. In 1976,
color television sales in Japan exceeded 5 million units; fewer than 500 of
those units were imported. (Appendix C)
The exclusions of foreign competition from the Japanese market is an
essential part of an export strategy based on dumping. It has provided Japanese
television producers with profits substantial enough in their home market to
permit them to sell their products in the American market at prices so low
as to displace and/or destroy domestic competitors. Television dumping on the
scale that we have witnessed in the United States simply could not have been
continued without the financial support resulting from very sizable profits in
a protected home market.
CONCLUSION
Zenith has concluded from years of direct involvement in the television
dumping case that policy-level officials of the U.S. Government have regarded
the American television industry to be a pawn that might readily be sacrificed
in order to avoid a diplomatic confrontation with Japan or to accomplish some
other diplomatic objective. As a result of Treasury's avoidance for more than
a decade of its responsibility to enforce the antidumping law, ther stockholders
and employees of American television companies have been effectively deprived
of their right to the protection afforded by that law. The television case should,
therefore, be of great concern to any who believe that this is a nation ruled
by law and not by men.
The television dumping case raises serious economic issues that should be
of concern to those interested in preserving this country's free enterprise system.
In the last decade five major American producers have abandoned the television
industry and other American producers have been so scarred by unlawful
dumping as to be left far less competitive in the American market than they
might otherwise have been.
If a firm is to prosper or even survive in the American enterprise system
it must be able to invest in laboratories to improve technology and in plant
and equipment to improve productivity. The funds required to support these
investments must come either from corporate profits or from investors who
believe that their investments will generate an adequate future return. An
industry confronted with the predatory pricing associated with the dumping
can neither earn the profits nor obtain the investor confidence needed to
finance those investments.
Dumping has already produced economic chaos in the American television
industry and in the American steel industry. The American semiconductor,
computer and automobile industries are today, in varying degrees, threatened
with that kind of chaos. Unless this country demonstrates the ability to enforce
vigorously and quickly its antidumping laws, dozens of other American industries
will be left exposed to assaults like that which has been mounted against the
American television industry.
American trade deficits with Japan have jumped sharply since the oil crisis.
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In 1974 and again in 1975 the U.S. trade deficit with Japan totaled $1.7
billion. In 1976 the deficit rose to $5.4 billion, in 1977 to $8.1 billion and in
1978 it totaled $11.6 billion.56 The rapidly growing deficits with Japan have
not occurred because of a sudden change in the relative productivity of Japanese
and American manufacturers.
On the issue of productivity, many Americans have been confused by
Department of Labor reports that manufacturing output per man-hour increased
by. 82% in Japan from 1967 to 1975 and by only 16% in the United States.
The slower growth in American productivity and the low prices of imported
television receivers and steel in the American market have apparently led many
to conclude that the United States is at a productivity disadvantage. (Appendix
D)
In 1975, the last year for which measurements are available, manufacturing
output per man-hour in Japan was 64.9% of manufacturing output per man-hour
in the United States. Expressed differently, in 1975 the average American
manufacturing employee produced about 50% more per hour worked than did
his counterpart in Japan. It is the absolute level of productivity, not the rate
of productivity growth that determines a nation's ability to compete in world
markets. America is certainly not at a productivity disadvantage.
In 1978, the American trade deficit totaled a staggering $29 billion. Some
$14 billion of that deficit was incurred in trade with the thirteen members of
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); almost $12 billion
was incurred in trade with Japan alone and a $3 billion deficit was incurred
in trade with the rest of the world. 57
Official Washington apparently continuesto believe that vigorous enforcement
of this country's antidumping laws would be regarded by our trading partners
to be protectionist and would, therefore, threaten the world trading system. A
strong case can be made that nothing would threaten the world trading system
more than the continuation of American trade deficits of the magnitude
experienced in 1978 and the continuation of the instability in the value of the
American dollar that has resulted from our 1977 and 1978 deficits.
Dumping can no more be tolerated than bribery as a tactic for increasing
sales in a export market. Either dumping or bribery will improve the position
of the user in the short term. Their long-term impact, however, is to weaken
the confidence of the peoples of the world in the trade system and to generate
the protectionist reactions that might ultimately destroy that system.
The $400 million dumping finding suggests that during the 1972 to 1977
period, the average Japanese television set had been imported into the United
States at about $40 under its fair market value. A $40 advantage at the time
of importation would give the Japanese television sets a retail price advantage,
relative to the products of domestic producers, of $65 to $75. That price
advantage did not result because the Japanese were more efficient than their
U.S. competitors, but rather because they had been able to violate American
antidumping statutes with impunity for more than a decade.
There is a startling difference between the manner in which the American
public and American leaders perceive the importance of foreign trade problems.
The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations commissioned the Gallup organization,
in late 1978, to measure the attitudes of the American public and American
56. United States Department of Commerce statistics.
57. id.
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leaders on a variety of foreign policy questions. 58 The two groups were asked
to rate various foreign policy goals in terms of whether those goals were very
important, somewhat important or not important. The 13 goals included:
"Keeping up the value of the dollar, Securing adequate supplies of energy,
Protecting jobs of American workers, Worldwide arms control, Containing
Communism" and eight other items.
The goal of "Protecting jobs of American workers" was perceived by 78%
of the American public to be very important; only 34% of the American
leaders perceived that goal to be very important. Among the American public
only one foreign policy goal "Keeping up the value of the dollar" was seen
to be more important than protecting American jobs. Among the American
leaders only four of the thirteen foreign policy goals were perceived to be less
important than protecting American jobs. Among the American public, 45%
of the respondents perceived "Protecting interests of American business abroad"
to be very important; only 27% of the American leaders perceived that goal
to be very important.59
The attitudes of American leaders on foreign trade questions continue to
be based on a Marshall Plan mefitality that sees Europe and Japan as being
so weak in economic matters as to require continuing American concessions
and that sees the United States as being so strong as to be immune from
economic injury no matter what trade concessions are made by its government.
Treasury's long avoidance of its responsibility to enforce the antidumping laws
in the television case is only one example of the American Government's
willingness to wink at unfair and unlawful acts in foreign trade in order to
avoid diplomatic confrontation. There are growing signs, however, that the
United States Government is losing the support of the American public on
trade matters. In August of 1978 the Harris Survey reported that by a margin
of 61%-33% the American public now favors a greater restriction on imports
rather than a continuation of this country's traditional policy of freer trade
with most countries of the world. 60
Vigorous enforcement of American laws designed to control dumping and
other unfair trade practices can be urged solely on the grounds that American
stockholders and employees are entitled to the protection afforded by law.
Vigorous enforcement of those laws can also be urged because dumping and
other unfair trade practices constitute an intolerable threat to this country's
free enterprise system and appear to have contributed substantially to our
staggering trade deficits in recent years.
In the Harris Survey in which Americans by a 61%-33% margin favored
a greater restriction on imports, the respondents agreed by a margin of 64%-26%
with the statement: "We have been made suckers by other countries which
restrict U.S. goods, but whose goods are free to come into this country." In
commenting on the survey Lou Harris, however, noted: "There is a fundamental
feeling in this country that if artificial barriers against American goods were
removed or tempered, then our products could compete on a profitable basis."
58. Gallup, Foreign Policy Goals for the United States-1978, in American Public Opinion and United
States Foreign Policy 1979, at 12 (John E. Reilly ed. 1979).
59. Id.
60. Harris, Protectionist Sentiment is Growing on Imports, The Harris Survey (August 10, 1978).
19791
Journal of Legislation [Vol. 6: 24
There is considerable reason to believe that what has been described as
"protectionist sentiment" in the Congress and in the American public is not
a cry for help from people who are unwilling or unable to compete. That
so-called "protectionist sentiment" is in large part an angry reaction from
citizens who believe the United States is being injured by unfair trade practices
that its government has been unwilling or unable to control. A continued
failure on the part of the United States Government to enforce laws prohibiting
dumping and other unfair trade practices can have no other result than to
lead increased numbers of Americans to withdraw their support from this
country's traditional position of encouraging freer trade throughout the world.
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